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ABSTRACT
The emergence of Swine Flu in the past six months has once again heightened the world’s 
fears of a coming flu pandemic.  Although H1N1 is only slightly more pathogenic than the 
common seasonal flu, which kills approximately 30,000 Americans each year, its rapid transmis-
sion around the globe is nonetheless alarming and once again reveals the deficiencies in the 
government’s detection, prevention and response.  Currently few governments are adequately 
prepared for a possible outbreak.  
After a century of reliance on antibiotics and vaccines, new and reemerging drug-resistant dis-
eases  expose the necessity of domestic biosecurity in addition to the national and international 
policies.  Much like social unrest, wars and illnesses have in the past, the new pandemic crisis 
will shape architecture and urbanism dramatically.  It will require a responsive and adaptable 
architecture that provides a nuanced relationship between living, working and socializing in a 
manner that does not forsake community for quarantine.
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The emergence of Swine Flu during the beginning of 
2009 has once again heightened the world’s fears of 
a global influenza pandemic.  While initially thought 
to be only as deadly as the seasonal flu, which kills 
approximately 36,000 Americans each year, recent 
reports have added six thousand deaths to the US total 
in April,1 making on track to be over twice as deadly2.  
Regardless of the numbers, more alarming has been 
the well-publicized and rapid transmission around the 
globe, bringing into relief the deficiencies in the govern-
ment’s response.  Though thousands have died, H1N1 
has not manifested itself as ‘the big one’ with sweeping 
societal effects like the Spanish Flu of 1918, which in-
fected 500 million people3, and killed 1% of the human 
race4.  In fact, it is not even the most pathogenic strand 
of influenza currently circulating.  That distinction 
belongs to the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, or 
Bird Flu (H5N1), which has a mortality rate in humans 
of above 30%5.  H5N1 is currently endemic and in-
extinguishable in the waterfowl of South Asia, living 
silently among its hosts, only occasionally emerging as 
pathogenic in poultry, resulting in massive poultry culls 
in China, Thailand and Vietnam6.  Only in isolated cases, beginning in 
1997 has the disease undergone sufficient antigenic shift to become 
transmissible to humans, resulting in human fatalities, usually con-
fined to poultry workers. However, should the disease mutate further, 
acquiring the ability to be transmissible between humans, H5N1 would 
invariably set off a global pandemic killing 1 billion people in the worst 
case scenario7. 
Development in China, Thailand and Vietnam increasingly impacts 
asian duck migration routes and wetland habitats.  As South Asian 
cities grow at their periphery, their expanding industrialized food 
production system, which includes poultry and pig farms, come in 
increasing proximity to virus-carrying waterfowl.  While Vietnamese 
and Thai farmers used to raise smaller flocks, Tyson-style  production 
has emerged to meet China’s growing market.  These massive indus-
trial chicken farms offer an unlimited breeding ground for new viruses, 
which by sheer number foil attempts at vaccination.  Often the only 
recourse is to cull the entire flock, but because only a few countries 
offer full reimbursement for culling poultry, farmers frequently collect 
government remuneration but sell infected meat anyway, or resist cull-
ing their entire flock to preserve their financial security.  The industrial-
ized farms are not the only problem, the wetmarkets commonly found 
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in many South Asian cities bring those chickens and ducks into the 
heart of the city, unleashing a host of new strains of influenza each 
year on the human population.
While the flu originates in fowl, pigs often act as virus incubators of 
both avian and human influenza strains.  Within the respiratory system 
of pigs (which bears similarity to humans’), human and avian strains 
recombine genetically.  While antigenic drift (the continual process by 
which proteins change amino acids to create modified strains of flu, 
each requiring a new vaccine) occurs each flu season, occasionally 
avian strain trades genes with a human influenza strains, and acquire 
the ability to infect humans.  This process of recombination is called 
antigenic shift.  Because of the radical genetic transformation, humans 
do not have existing antibodies or immunological memory to fight the 
disease. The recurrence of such an event means that influenza is a 
“constantly emerging disease.”8  Many epidemiologists fear that these 
pig farms, in close proximity to major world cities, will 
be the source of a subtle but critical antigenic shift of 
the endemic Avian Influenza, whereby it may acquire 
the ability to be transmissible between humans, setting 
off a deadly global pandemic.
The Pearl River Delta, China, the source of the sea-
sonal flu9 is an area of vast manufacturing potential, 
inextricably linked to the US and Europe through global 
capital.  The era of high-speed transportation and 
globalization means that H5N1 could be on the shores 
of the US within sixteen hours of emerging in Asia, 
and within 30 to 90 days could infect the entire US10.  
While the US government has production contracts 
with Novartis and the UK with GlaxoSmithKline to sup-
ply the country with millions of doses of seasonal flu 
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vaccine, the continual antigenic drift of the virus makes 
it impossible to stockpile, and new vaccines typically 
take six months to become available once a new strain 
has been identified.  Complicating the situation, drug 
companies are hesitant to release untested vaccines to 
the public because it leaves the company liable for any 
drug complications in addition to the financial burden 
of producing a potentially unprofitable drug.11  Despite 
the development of a worldwide surveillance network 
headed by the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention and the World Health Organization, the nature 
of the flu makes it difficult to quickly identify, as it often 
hides among secondary infections and is commonly 
misdiagnosed as any number of bronchial infections or 
ailments.  In addition, federal officials are hesitant to declare a state 
of emergency and the Chinese Government as well as other authori-
tarian states of Southeast Asia, which could be the sentinels of new 
strains, have in the past covered up or minimized outbreaks, as was 
the case with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003,12  
for fear of the economic and political toll a pandemic would wreak on 
their country.  All of which contribute to a delayed response time to an 
outbreak of what could be a devastating new virus, the speed of which 
far outpaces the response.  
Currently few governments are adequately prepared for a possible 
outbreak despite The World Health Organization’s Global Influenza 
Preparedness Plan, a document drafted to help assess the risk of new 
strains of influenza and facilitate management of an outbreak.  De-
ANITGENIC SHIFT
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spite the $3.7 billion since September 11, 2001 the U.S. has devoted 
to “emergency preparedness for bioterrorism, infectious disease out-
breaks and public health emergencies,”13  the emergency infrastruc-
ture collapsed during a May 2003 mock casualty exercise in Chicago.  
It became clear that the federal government’s reliance on a constel-
lation of state and local healthcare and emergency systems was a 
serious impediment to implementing a national biodefense strategy.14  
Similar to the situation during The Cold War, the responsibility of 
defense has shifted away from a government perceived as inefficient 
and ineffective, to the individual15.  While atomic an-
nihilation was an acute event, the flu recurs in waves 
and continually mutates to resist antibiotics.  As long 
as the fundamental causes of disease: poor sanita-
tion, overcrowding, access to healthcare and habitat 
destruction are not addressed on a world-wide scale, 
influenza will continue to emerge in new and virulent 
forms.  Many epidemiologists are surprised that these 
seemingly perfect conditions in South Asia, facilitated 
by rapid transportation and inadequate healthcare 
systems have not yet caused a global pandemic that 
rivals 1918.  But they agree that it is inevitable, and this 
pandemic will assuredly not be the last16.  
15
With regards to architecture, there has been a dominant trend in the 
last millennia towards greater atomization of biosecurity.  The first 
approaches towards protection emerged during the middle ages and 
were focussed on isolating villages and cities from all externalities, but 
as technology and society advanced, specific architectures emerged 
in response to the threat of diseases. 
During the growth of international trade during the Roman Empire new 
diseases found fertile ground for incubation on both sea-faring vessels 
and in the port cities of Europe.  Typically diseases spread outward 
from these ports into their hinterlands along trade routes.  To combat 
these diseases cities enacted two forms of protection.  The first, which 
was rarely used, was the sanitary cordon, a strict border around the 
city meant to prevent the interaction between the city and outsiders.  
Often breached and ineffective, this method stifled trade and was only 
ever used in isolated areas.17  Since the Middle Ages, quarantines 
have been the dominant method to stem the flow of disease vectors 
into port cities.  Quarantine, which applied to cargo and passengers 
alike, was a mandatory forty day waiting period during which the 
suspected ship was held at anchor outside of the city quays.  Quar-
antines were later shortened to 20 and 15 days, depending on the 
port and period.  Despite their long history, city-level quarantines were 
a relatively ineffective tool to stop disease.  Early port quarantines 
lacked the level of surveillance and coordination to successfully pre-
vent the spread of disease and it was not until the 20th century that 
there arose an international body to coordinate the issuance of bills of 
health.18  Before that time there was little trust in international sanitary 
conditions, and the spread of disease became politicized.
Once a disease was endemic to the population, there was little re-
course but to isolate the symptomatic individuals in the Lazaretto.  
Named after St. Lazar, the patron saint of lepers, these militarized 
enclosures were used for centuries for any number of diseases.  
While quarantine was instituted to isolate ships from suspect ports to Quarantine
Littoral Diseases
BIOSECURITY IN HISTORY
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ensure they are not carrying plague or communicable diseases, the 
Lazaretto was a form of quarantine for afflicted individuals, a variation 
of the pesthouse except individuals may return to the city after they 
have been cured of their affliction unless they have died.
Technology has both helped and hindered the process of disease 
surveillance, detection and communication.  Prior to the 19th century 
the fastest forms of travel were still measured in days, enough time for 
individuals to manifest symptoms of an infectious disease, giving the 
destination ports the opportunity to enact quarantines and brace for 
the effects of the disease.  The acceleration of transportation during 
the 20th century has allowed pathogens to enter cities surreptitiously, 
emerging after they has already infected dozens.  Ironically, the same 
advances in communication and transportation that have facilitated 
surveillance, treatments and coordination have allowed diseases to 
spread even more quickly.  
Architecture has played a role in the past in the treatment of diseases, 
not just in the form of hospitals, but as instruments of health them-
selves.  The sanataria of the 19th century used orientation, light and 
air as agents of health in the days before the availability of vaccines.  
While previous generations have used the salubrious qualities of the 
architecture to prevent/treat/cure diseases, in the age of rapidly mutat-
ing and globally footloose viruses the role of architecture has shifted 
to that of prevention/protection/preservation.  However, architecture it-
self has been implicated as a disease vector, requiring a finer grain of 
intervention to provide maximum bio-security.  One specific instance 
would be the case of Amoy Gardens in Hong Kong.  
The dominant trend had been towards increasingly smaller interven-
tions into the cityscape, from the city walls and shores, to just shy of 
the house.  As architecture began to be mobilized under the nascent 
modernism as a weapon against the miasmic medieval city, advances 
in the fields of medicine and epidemiology had developed drugs and 
anti-virals that replaced these physical and corporeal interventions.  
The Lazaretto
Footloose Diseases
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WHO issues global alert concerning 
a new infectious disease in Hong 
Kong
Amoy Gardens, Hong Kong
The example of Amoy Garden represents an 
interesting case of a disease spread not only 
through close and direct contact, but facilitated 
by the building itself.  Unforeseen aspects 
of the building, including the airflow around 
the blocks, the dimensions of the light wells, 
orientation of the units and the cleanliness 
and maintenance of the sewage system all 
contributed to a much faster transmission rate 
of the disease than would be expected from a 
single index patient.
MARCH 14-19, 2003
The index patient visits his brother 
on the seventh floor, flat seven in 
Block E of Amoy Gardens, Kowloon
MARCH 24, 2003
The disease spreads throughout 
Amoy Gardens, peaking at 321 cases, 
distributed throughout the 19 blocks but 
concentrated mostly in blocks E, B, C, 
D.  Within Block E, Units 7 and 8 have 
the greatest concentration of infections 
at 73% and 42% of the population
But a century of reliance on drug therapies has un-
leashed a host of new and re-emerging diseases that 
resist those drugs, and scourges of the past, thought to 
be extinct in the modern world are re-emerging, as is 
the case with drug resistant tuberculosis, whose treat-
ment can last as long as five months.19  
In facing these new drug-resistant diseases, it is the 
intention of the project to pick up where history had left 
off over a century ago, namely the logical progression 
towards a domestic biosecurity.  Even though the government may 
now have the technology and resources to attack these disease as 
they emerge, it has been neutered by the requirement to preserve 
the civil rights of its citizens and to protect trade relations with its 
neighbors.  Through the US Model State Emergency Health Pow-
ers Act, states have sought to balance the government’s power with 
individual rights.  Ultimately the act, which has only been ratified by 
half the states, would not go nearly far enough to effectively quash an 
emerging pandemic and as a result, the onus increasingly falls on the 
citizens for their own protection. 
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Authorities quarantine Block E.  The 
Balcony is closed and guarded by police
APRIL 1, 2003
Residents are evacuated to Lei Yue Mun 
Holiday Camp.  Two days later, protests 
arise over washroom sharing
APRIL 8, 2003
SARS begins to affect residents in 
Lower Ngau Tau Kok Estate, adjacent to 
Amoy Gardens
This project situates itself in between two paradigms, the architecture 
of civil defense, and the architecture of health.  As it becomes clear 
that maintaining civil liberties may put the general public at risk, meth-
ods of domestic biosecurity will become necessary elements of the 
built environment.  For that reasons this project resonates most with 
the prefabricated bomb shelters of WWII and the Cold War in both 
use and scale.  At times of crisis, individuals are not only looking for 
a contingency plan independent of national and international policies 
and procedures, but also a piece of mind.  
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localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming 
increasingly better adapted to humans, but may not 
yet be fully transmissible.
Undetermined source of infection, or isolated family 
outbreak.  Spread of virus to a close household.
Verify availability and distribution procedures for 
personal protective equipment and antivirals and 
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A circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses 
a substantial risk of human disease, but no 
subtypes present in humans.
GLOBAL INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS PLAN
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATON
In 2005 the World Health Organization established a 
Global Influenza Preparedness Plan to assist mem-
ber states in responding to the threat of Pandemic 
Influenza, mainly in response to the growing threat 
of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, which ripped 
through Asian poultry flocks in 2003.  The plan outlines 
new phases Classifying a pandemic, and recommends 
actions during each phase to be undertaken by the 
relevant national authorities.  The plan also outlines the 
relationships and responsibilities of the WHO during a 
crisis, and its role in surveillance, detection, communi-
cation and containment.
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Perhaps the best example of comprehensive military 
and civilian defense may be the Flak Towers and Hoch-
bunkers that ringed key cities in Germany and Austria 
during the Second World War.  As part of a defensive 
strategy to deflect allied attacks on the homeland, 
the Nazis built several types of towers that served as 
installations for anti-aircraft weaponry, rely stations for 
military coordination and defense for the civilian popu-
lation.  The robust construction of the towers served 
the dual role of not only protecting the gun placements 
but also creating a protected interior, which proved 
to be one of the safest places in Berlin during allied 
attacks.  Built from reinforced concrete, the walls were 
several meters thick and were virtually impenetrable.  
While there were many underground bunkers and shel-
ters, it can be assumed that the conspicuousness of 
these towers made them not only symbolic of the Berlin 
defenses, but also their own civil defense signposts, 
directing any unfortunate pedestrians towards a place of refuge.  
A slightly smaller example of civilian defense during the war was the 
Winkeltürme, named for Leo Winkel of Duisburg. Winkel patented 
his design in 1934, and from 1936 on, Germany built 98 Winkeltürme 
of five different types.  These structures had a Small footprint which 
made them difficult targets and had curved walls, which were believed 
to deflect blasts, much like the bunkers of the Atlantic Wall.20  
While the Flak Towers of Berlin represent a typology of buildings, 
much like the Atlantic Wall, they were individual structures, built one 
at a time at an enormous cost of labor and materials.  As the scale of 
the shelter becomes smaller, their purposes become more special-
ized and became a manufactured element within the industrial war 
machine.  Smaller structures could be packaged into kits and sold to 
civilians or easily built offsite and brought in prefabricated, and indeed 
the survival rate was much improved thanks to the coordinated ef-
fort that dispersed shelters to the residents of London.  Civil Defense 
BOMB SHELTERS AND CIVIL DEFENSE
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during the Axis bombing campaign in Great Britain during World War II 
had two directions, make-shift community shelters were created in the 
tunnels of the London Underground, which served most of the popula-
tion who sought shelter, and a campaign to produce affordable per-
sonal shelters designed for Londoners’ homes.  Two notable designs 
were pre-manufactured and made available to the public at subsidized 
rates through the government.
The Anderson shelter was designed to protect between four and six 
people during aerial bombardments during World War II.  The shelter 
was designed according to the average household size of the popu-
lation living in the terrace houses of London and was sized to fit in 
a common backyard.21  It was constructed from a kit that included 
fourteen sheets of corrugated steel, dimensional lumber, nuts, bolts 
and washers.  Six Arched steel sheets formed the body of the struc-
ture, with two larger panels acting as protection on the ends.  There 
was no door in the shelter, rather inhabitants would block the entrance 
with sacks or blankets.  Typically the shelters were buried partially 
underground and covered with at least a foot of earth.  The 
earth berm covering the shelter doubled as a place to grow 
vegetables during the rationing period, and awards were 
given out for the best planted shelter.  
The design was very simple, designed, drafted, tested and 
sent to production with three weeks in 1938.  The shelters 
were designed to ensure that there was enough air for 
four people during an attack, that the shelters were easily 
accessible during emergencies and that they had a utility 
after the conflict was over.  The shelters were easy to erect 
and cheap, but had poor ventilation, were cold and often 
damp.  The conditions inside precluded them from being 
used nightly for protection, rather they were typically only 
used in emergencies.  Even though the Luftwaffe switched 
from daytime to nighttime bombing, shelters were not 
universally used.  In 1940, only 27% of Londoners slept in 
their Anderson Shelters, 9% used public shelters and 4% 
25
CORRUGATED STEEL
EARTH FROM THE PIT USED 
FOR THE SHELTER
HOOK FOR EASY TRANSPORT 
AND FABRICATION
CONCRETE BASE
STEEL PLATE ROOF
METAL MESH 
STEEL LEGS
MATTRESS SPRINGS 
ON BOTTOM
SPACE FOR A SINGLE OCCUPANT
CAST STEEL CONSTRUCTION
CURVED TO DEFLECT BLAST
/MINIMIZE MATERIAL
1
PERSON
.8 m2 
TOTAL AREA
12,500  
PERSONS PER HA
2.4 m2 
TOTAL AREA
4  
PERSONS
16,667
PERSONS PER HA
3.5 m2 
TOTAL AREA
6
PERSONS
17,142
PERSONS PER HA
EINMANN-LUFTSCHUTZBUNKER
used underground stations.  2.25 million shelters were 
delivered throughout the war to UK residents, begin-
ning in 1939.  The shelters were free for those families 
earning less than 250£ sterling and only 7£ for those 
over the limit.22
   
In 1941 the government began issuing Morrison Shel-
ters as an alternative for families who did not have a 
basement or a yard for an Anderson shelter.  Anderson 
shelters were unsafe to use inside of existing buildings 
because of the possibility of trapping the inhabitants in-
side if there were a fire or gas leak following an attack.  
The Morrison’s mesh sides provided greater ventilation 
and the shelter was easy to enter and exit.  Morrison 
Shelters, officially called a Table Indoor Shelter, were 
little more than a mattress with mesh sides and a steel 
top. (A two-level version was produced in addition to 
the single table style)  The sides deformed as debris 
fell on the ceiling, but kept the family safe.  There was 
room for approximately four people.  The sides were 
removable to allow the shelter to be used as a table.  
They came in kits of 359 parts and 3 tools and were 
available for free to those who made less than 350£ 
a year.  By 1942, 500,000 had been distributed and 
100,000 more in 1943 as the Nazis began attacking 
using the V1 Flying Bomb.  The shelter was very ef-
fective when sited correctly and could withstand most 
bombardments excluding a direct hit.
At the smallest scale, Germany was prefabricating the 
Einmann-Luftschutzbunker, a one-man bunker meant 
to be installed at rail depots and other infrastructure 
sites across Germany that would likely be targets 
for Allied bombers.  They were size to fit one person 
standing, and were only meant to be occupied for brief 
periods during an attack.  They were were cheap and easily installed 
but had limited application beyond immediate protection.
The table was an example of the beginning of the domestication of 
civil defense, which would reach a new level during the second half 
of the twentieth century, as fallout shelters were designed to double 
as dens and playrooms, and the safe room became an architectural 
element that was built into new houses. It has been estimated that by 
1965, around 200,000 fallout shelters had been built.  Roughly one 
for every nine hundred persons, or one for every 266 households.  A 
small number when considering that 53% of Americans believed that 
a nuclear war was likely to occur23.  At first fallout shelters were gener-
ally embraced, but it only took two years for them to be discredited.  
Initially pushed by the Civil Defense Department, they were invoked 
as the only sure way to ensure the safety of the family in the event 
of a nuclear disaster, but their efficiency was increasingly called into 
question.  In addition, the existence of a fallout shelter in the backyard 
cast a pall over suburban life.  Their ability to survive a nuclear at-
tack was dubious, and hundreds of shelter building firms that gouged 
consumers began to discredit the enterprise.  Constructing shelters in 
urban areas would have been prohibitively expensive and futile given 
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BASEMENT FALLOUT SHELTER
the warning time was typically only 3-5 minutes prior to a nuclear 
event.  
While the Kennedy Administration’s initial position held the family 
responsible for their own safety and the government in charge of 
foreign policy, their tactic shifter towards community shelters due in 
part because of blow back from shifty shelter builders and the growing 
unease with “shelter morality.”  The laissez-faire approach to shelter 
building also revealed an embedded class bias in society.  “That 
nuclear survival was enhanced by residency in the suburbs was noted 
by others, including John Kenneth Galbraith.  In a letter to Kennedy, 
Galbraith called the suburban bias of the fallout shelter program “a 
design for saving Republicans and sacrificing Democrats.”24  One 
approach taken by Denver in the early sixties was to build neighbor-
hood shelters for twenty families, in which families would buy stock at 
$1200 to $1500, making shelters more economical and reducing the 
moral decisions that needed to be made in the worst case.25
THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEFENSE
An architecture of protection has always had a tenuous relationship 
with the human psyche.  It is debatable how close the US and the 
USSR came to a nuclear war, but part of what prevented the whole-
sale adoption of nuclear countermeasures and fallout shelters was 
the psychological presence of a fallout shelter itself, which stood as 
a continual reminder of the tense nuclear standoff.26  In addition to 
many, the prospect of hiding underground while at war with the Soviet 
Union felt distinctly un-American.  Americans were unwilling to give 
into a fear that would alter their lives.  In addition there was the com-
monly held belief that the survivors would envy the dead upon inherit-
ing a decimated landscape with a fractured and dispersed population 
that in no way resembles the country they left behind.  
The condition for surviving a pandemic however would 
be much different, and while populations may be 
decimated, the physical geography of the planet would 
remain unchanged.  Protection from a pandemic need 
not have the same level of physical protection from 
cataclysmic events, which allows greater liberty in de-
signing pandemic-proof shelter.  Because of the forces 
bomb shelters are required to repel, there was little 
ability for them to expand, be portable, adaptable or 
communicative.  The question remains, how to design 
an architecture that both protects the inhabitants from 
the transmission of pandemic viruses, while retaining a 
connectivity to the context and functionality?
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The Iron Lung
THE IMAGE OF PROTECTION
Design Precedents
While the project is concerned with protection of the 
inhabitants from the environment, a critical factor in 
its design is the impression of protection it provides.  
Because it is a relatively novel consumer product, it 
is critical that the project convey the image of protec-
tion.  Formally the project looks to the emerging archi-
tecture of healthcare devices and products from the 
last century.  These products exist between the scale 
of industrial design and architecture.  It is a realm of 
corporeal augmentations that approach what could be 
considered ‘habitable.’
One source of inspiration is the iron lung, which first 
became prevalent during the polio outbreak of the early 
twentieth century.  Paralysis of the autonomic nervous 
system required breathing assistance, which the iron 
lung provides by means of an oscillating partial vacuum 
around the patient’s chest.  The negative pressure 
inside the chamber expands and contracts the patients 
lungs much like the diaphragm muscles would on a 
healthy patient.  Although direct intubation has become 
the de facto method of treating respiratory failure, the 
use of the iron lung has persisted for treating certain 
ailments.  While it has fallen out of failure, a new 
product from the U.K., first tested in 2008 at Children’s 
Hospital, Buffalo, is paving the way towards a revival 
of negative pressure ventilation to treat cystic fibrosis, 
asthma and emphysema.  Biphasic Cuirass Ventilation, 
essentially a portable iron lung uses the same concept, 
but is more compact and uses updated technology.  
BCV is not as invasive as intubation, and prevents the 
harmful build up of CO2 and fluids in the lung as well 
as the trauma to the patient.  It is more natural and al-
lows the patient to be weaned off of the ventilator when possible. 
 
This project draws inspiration from the materiality and the adaptability 
of these medical devices.  Contemporary medical devices use plastics 
not only for their durability and ease of manufacturing, but because 
they are also easily cleaned and can take on many biomorphic forms 
only available through a thermoplastic manufacturing process.  Vinyl 
and latex provide vision and light through the device while protecting 
the individual from exterior forces.  The scale of the project, protection 
for two to four individuals, suggests the same manufacturing system 
and componentized delivery method as well as similar materials.  
Because this project is subject to repeated use by many different 
individuals, just like the iron lung or defibrillator, ease of disinfecting is 
a priority and is partly responsible for the ‘hospital corners’ aesthetic.  
Much like healthcare machines, this project attempts to eliminate 
extraneous elements, resulting in a streamlined exercise in minimal 
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Biphasic Cuirass Ventilation System “What not to wear when worrying about the flu”
Fashion Flu Masks, Nuvo Accessories
living.  This hybrid, body-scaled architecture can exist within the larger 
built environment, between the building and room scale.  It is a sec-
ondary, subversive and personal architecture that forsakes its immedi-
ate context to provide protection.
Additionally this project was inspired by the micro architecture of 
Richard Horden for its portability, self-contained systems, multi-use 
spaces and its ability to adapt to varying site conditions, as well as the 
inventive inversions of R&Sie Architects, whose Mosquito Bottleneck 
suggests a new paradigm of living in proximity to immediate threats.
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MOSQUITO BOTTLENECK, Trinidad, R&Sie Architects
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The Spandrobe - Kohn Shnier ArchitectsMicro Compact Home - Horden Cherry Lee Architects
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Material and Tectonic Studies
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Material and Tectonic Studies
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Design Proposal
The final configuration is an invacuation pod for indi-
viduals or families in the face of a global pandemic.  It 
is intended to be a subscription service, much like what 
was pioneered in certain communities during the early 
sixties for civil defense, whereby individuals purchase 
shares in a national supply of invacuation pods.  These 
pods, which are stored off-site can be deployed at a 
moments notice within a house or apartment should 
the anxiety of navigating a pandemic city become too 
great.  Although the unit is designed for invacuation, 
it could be imagined that in certain situations, it could 
serve effectively as in-house quarantine unit.  Depend-
ing on the pervasiveness of the pandemic, there might 
exist a moment when the number of sick out number 
the healthy by a margin that calls into question the 
idea of invacuation, and quarantine might become the 
dominant method of containing the disease. 
The project is designed around a titanium tube space truss structure, 
which is the dominant structural system, into which plug carbon fiber 
programmatic pods.  The standardized bay spacing allows the cus-
tomer to choose any combination program pods that provide spaces 
for sleeping, eating, socializing, and bathing among other uses.  The 
base configuration of essential pods fits entirely within a common 
apartment, with only a small portion protruding out of a window to 
access light and air, however this base unit can be expanded with 
additional pods and structure, building on air rights above sidewalks 
and streets. 
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1.  ETFE Pillows
2.  Infrastructure Pod
3.  Waste + Sanitation Pod
4.  Shear Cables
5.  Tapered Titanium Tube 
Strucutre
6.  Ceiling Plenum
1.
3.4.
5.
6.
2.
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Doorways, stairs and hallways are often the greatest 
impediments to home delivery, however building codes 
and conventions have generally standardized their 
dimensions.  Contemporary hallways and doors must 
be able to accommodate the bulkiest consumer items 
such as refrigerators, sofas and mattresses or else it 
would be impossible to furnish one’s apartment.  
Because this project is meant to be quickly assembled 
and dissembled within an apartment, it is necessary 
that the pod be broken into components that are 
smaller than these home furnishings, ensuring that it 
can be deployed to virtually any home or apartment. 
In addition the project must conform to maximum 
overall size parameters, in this case driven by the 
dimensions of a typical, perhaps generous Boston apartment.  This 
typical apartment in a masonry and wood building has a floor to ceil-
ing height of approximately 9’-6” and a living room of around 200 sqf. 
with punched opening windows measuring around 3’-0 X 6’-0”.  These 
dimensions are taken as the most restrictive, ensuring that the project 
will be able to be installed in many other apartments with more gener-
ous dimensions.
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3’-0”
ca. 6’-6”
ca. 3’-0”
ca. 2’-3”
ca. 5’-10”
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6’-0”
6.
7.
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9.
5.
3.
4.
1.
2.
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1.  Floor and ceiling plena
2.  Service pod
3.  Etfe pillow and frame
4.  Structural tubes
5.  Sealing pole caps
6.  Plenum connectors
7.  Structural base
8.  Omni-directional nodes
9.  Cable and turnbuckles
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While there is the appearance of several disengaged 
systems at work in this project, in reality many of the 
systems are interdependent.   Much like automotive 
dashboards, each pod is simultaneously structure and 
infrastructure.  The carbon fiber pods provide habitable 
space and contain program as well as provide shear 
resistance within the structural system.  The pods are 
composed of two layers of carbon fiber separated by 
a gap, which serves as the primary chase space for 
services and insulation.  An extruded section of carbon 
fiber attached by structural webbing creates chambers 
in the floor and ceiling through which run the low pres-
sure air to inflate the ETFE pillows, the HVAC supply 
and return, bathroom ventilation as well as conduit for 
the electrical system.  
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FLOOR SYSTEM
15.  Electrical Connection
16.  Return Air Duct within Plenum Structure
17. Flexible Duct Connection 
18.  Additional Units
CEILING SYSTEM
1.  Electrical Connection
2.  Lighting
3.  Filtered Air Supply
4.  Bathroom Vent Return
5.  ETFE Inflation Air Source and Hose
6.  Flexible Duct Connection
INFRASTRUCTURE UNIT
7.  Air Exhaust
8.  Photo Voltaic Panel
9.  Electrical Inverter and Batteries
10.  Low-Pressure Air Supply
11.  Hvac and Air Filtration System
12.  Full-Spectrum Light Replacement Lamps
13.  Air Intake
14.  Air Return
3.
4.
5.
6.
2.
17.
18.
16.
15.
14.
13.
12.
11.
7.
8.
9.
10.
1.
The dominant structural system in this project is a 
three dimensional space frame composed of tubular 
titanium spokes and adjustable cast metal nodes.  In 
cross section, braided cable connected to metal flitch 
plates attached to the nodes prevent wracking, as well 
as the project’s metal feet.  In the longitudinal direction, 
tubular cross bracing provides structural stability.  In 
certain cases, infill pods with reinforced corners act as 
shear panels.
As the project cantilevers out of a window or building 
perforation, additional compression elements extend to 
the ceiling to brace the entire structure.  Although the 
project is meant to be deployed surreptitiously and with 
minimal impact on the building, it would be possible to 
provide additional cable support from the roof, or to ex-
tend the structure to a nearby building, bracing against 
an exterior wall.
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SECTION
PLAN
SECTION
1.  EXTERIOR CABLE CROSS BRACING
2.  CAST METAL NODES
3.  TAPERED TITANIUM TUBING
4.  METAL FEET
5.  POD AS SHEAR PANEL
6.  CANTILEVER BRACING
4’ - 6” 4’ - 6”
3.
5.
6.
4.
3.
2.
1.
1.  Exterior cable cross bracing
2.  Cast metal nodes
3.  Tapered titanium tubing
4.  Metal feet
5.  Pod as shear panel
6.  Cantilever bracing
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BASIC MODEL
Communication, Disinfection, Ex-
change, and Monitoring
Waste and Sanitation
Sleeping, Storage and Table
Infrastructure
DELUXE
Communication, Disinfection, Ex-
change and Monitoring
Infrastructure
Waste and Sanitation
Food Preparation (2)
Sleeping and Socializing
Seating and Storage
DELUXE+
Communication, Disinfection, Ex-
change and Monitoring
Infrastructure
Waste and Sanitation
Food Preparation (2)
Sleeping and Socializing
Seating and Storage
Aggregation Connection to Other 
Units
Additional Sleeping Quarters
Extra Water Storage
Enhanced Exchange Pod
SLEEPING + STORAGE 
+ TABLE
INFRASTRUCTURE POD COMMUNICATION + ENTRY 
+ DISINFECTION 
+ MONITORING
COMPONENTS
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The core unit is designed for an individual living at 
home with at least one other family member or care-
taker.  It accommodates one healthy individual for up to 
three weeks, while the threat of pandemic harmlessly 
passes by.
While the pod is fundamentally limited by the necessity 
of a caretaker to provide food and company, the situ-
ation where there is a disparity in prophylaxis within 
a single household is  real and relevant.  Every flu 
pandemic has affected particular segments of society 
most.  While it is often children, the elderly and the 
infirm, the familiar ‘W’ curve of the 1918 flu reveals how 
other more robust demographics may be susceptible to 
a particular flu strain.  In addition, deaths from Hospital-
Acquired Infections and secondary infections skew the 
actual number of flu deaths, which leaves the home 
as one of the last resorts for someone escaping the 
pandemic. 
Although the unit is designed for invacuation, it could 
be imagined that in certain situations, it could serve 
effectively as in-house quarantine unit.  Depending on 
the pervasiveness of the pandemic, there might exist 
a moment when the number of sick out number the 
healthy by a margin that calls into question the idea of 
invacuation, and quarantine might become the domi-
nant method of containing the disease.
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BASIC MODEL
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Sleeping, Storage and Table
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DELUXE
Communication, Disinfection, Ex-
change and Monitoring
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Waste and Sanitation
Food Preparation (2)
Sleeping and Socializing
Seating and Storage
DELUXE+
Communication, Disinfection, Ex-
change and Monitoring
Infrastructure
Waste and Sanitation
Food Preparation (2)
Sleeping and Socializing
Seating and Storage
Aggregation Connection to Other 
Units
Additional Sleeping Quarters
Extra Water Storage
Enhanced Exchange Pod
FOOD PREPARATION + 
STORAGE
SLEEPING + SOCIALIIZING
COMPONENTS
SLEEPING + STORAGE 
+ TABLE
COMMUNICATION + ENTRY 
+ DISINFECTION 
+ MONITORING
WASTE + SANITATION
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In the case where two or more people 
require invacuation, the unit can be 
expanded with pods that fulfill more 
diversified programs, including food 
preparation, expanded living quarters, 
and entertainment.  While these pods 
can maintain a certain level of inde-
pendence, they are still limited by the 
requirements of food and supplies, 
though one would only need to occupy 
the pod for a matter of weeks.
Because of the potential encumbrance 
created by the addition of a pod to an 
apartment to the residents outside of 
the pod, the unit can cantilever out-
ward from a typical window using the 
floor and ceiling as bracing.  Because 
the units are made from carbon fiber 
and most of the heaviest program-
matic pods remain inside the building, 
a modest cantilever can be achieved, 
which will ease the space pressures 
inside the apartment and provide 
greater visibility and light to the resi-
dents of the pod.
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CORE ELEMENT:
1.  Photovoltaic Panel
2.  Inverter and Batteries
3.  Low-Pressure ETFE Inflation Pump 
4.  Air Purification, Air Conditioning, Heating and 
Ventilation
5.  Intake Air Scoop
6.  Exhaust Vent
7.  Flexible Conduit
8.  Integrated Chase Space
9.  UV Daylight Simulation Bulbs
SCALE:
3/8” = 1’-0” 0 1 5
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1.  Entry Door with UV Disinfection Lamps
2.  Expandable Membrane Enclosure
3.  Health Monitoring Station
4.  Window Partition
5.  Transfer Compartment
6.  Refrigerated Specimen Container
7.  Heads-Up Display
CORE ELEMENT:
SCALE:
3/8” = 1’-0” 0 1 5
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CORE ELEMENT:
1.  Detachable Composting Toilet
2.  Water Filtration System
3.  Greywater Storage
4.  Freshwater Storage
5.  Ventilation Duct
6.  Water Chase
SCALE:
3/8” = 1’-0” 0 1 5
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CORE ELEMENT:
1.  Sleeping/Sitting unit
2.  Bedding Storage
3.  Swing-out Table
4.  Storage
5.  Lighting/Ventilation Control
SCALE:
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EXPANSION UNIT:
1.  Bed Above
2.  Fold-Down Table
3.  Expandable Seating
4.  Storage
5.  Ladder
SCALE:
3/8” = 1’-0” 0 1 5
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EXPANSION UNIT:
1.  Gas Stove
2.  Tank Storage
3.  Refrigerator
4.  Storage Units
5.  Ventilation Chase
6.  Water Chase
SCALE:
3/8” = 1’-0” 0 1 5
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EXPANSION UNIT:
1.  Seating
2.  Fold-Down Table
3.  Storage
SCALE:
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CORE CONFIGURATION SCALE:3/8” = 1’-0” 0 1 5
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EXPANDED CONFIGURATION SCALE:3/8” = 1’-0” 0 1 5
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Final Model
68
69
Final Model
70
71
Final Model
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In Situ Rendering
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As the number of cases increase, and hospital beds 
become scarce during a pandemic, the prevalence of 
the invacuation pod within the space of the city has 
the potential to create an entirely new urban condition.  
Much like masks worn in public, or the ringing of the 
leper’s bell, these interventions become a manifesta-
tion of the anxiety that has plagued the city since its 
inception.  How does one balance the need for interac-
tion and commerce with personal protection?  When 
does this balance tip in favor of one versus the other.  
In this regard, the Model State Emergency Health Pow-
ers Act is an important lens through which to view this 
paradox through government policy.  While expanding 
the powers of the government in time of duress may be 
more effective in quashing communicable diseases, it 
violates the essence of the social contract.  This project 
seeks a similar compromise, providing protection, but making certain 
concessions in order to engage with the city itself.  While one may 
have invacuated oneself into a pod, its expansion beyond the building 
envelope engages the space that facilitates the transmission of the 
disease, simultaneously being more secure and more exposed as well 
as acting as a barometer of the health of the citizens.
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Aerial Rendering
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Previous Incarnations
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Appendix & References
As part of the federal government’s plan to streamline 
domestic biosecurity in the face of looming threats 
from both biological terrorism and emerging diseases, 
government drafted the Model State Emergency Health 
Powers Act as a piece of model legislation to be ratified 
and amended by the states individually.  The ratio-
nale being that the localized nature of most biological 
disasters are best dealt with at a state and local level, 
however during a crises that may have national effects, 
coordination between states will be facilitated if they 
share certain core elements of their disaster relief plan.
Excerpts from:
“The federal government has authority in the area of public health 
under its specific constitutional role to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce, and its power to tax and spend to provide for the general 
welfare.  States have a long history of broad authority to protect the 
public health under what is known as their inherent police powers...
It brings into focus the powers that are required for government to 
conduct the activations of public health, including the control of bioter-
rorism...has been introduced in one form or another in the legislatures 
of 43 states.”  Bronze, 83
PREAMBLE
The act authorizes the collection of data and records, the control of 
property, the management of persons and access to communications. 
It allows for immediate investigation by granting access to individuals’ 
health information under specified circumstances.
They are also empowered to provide care and treatment to persons 
who are ill or who have been exposed to infection, and to separate 
affected individuals from the population at large for the purpose of 
interrupting the transmission of infection disease.
The act thus provides that, in the event of the exercise of emergency 
powers, the civil rights, liberties, and needs of infected or exposed 
persons will be protected given the primary goal of controlling serious 
health threats.
ARTICLE V:  CONTROL OF PERSONS
To compel a person to submit to a physical examination and/or testing 
as necessary to diagnose or treat the person.  
The public health authority may exercise the following emergency 
powers over individuals:  Establish and maintain places of isolation 
and quarantine and require isolation or quarantine of 
any person by the least restrictive means necessary to 
protect public health.  All reasonable means shall be 
taken to prevent the transmission of infection among 
the isolated or quarantined individuals.  
The public health authority may isolate or quarantine a 
person without first obtaining a written, ex parte order 
from the court if any delay in the isolation or quarantine 
of the person would pose an immediate threat to the 
public health.  
To compel a person to be vaccinated and/or treated for 
an infectious disease.  
ARTICLE IV:  CONTROL OF PROPERTY
Facilities:  To close, direct and compel the evacuation 
of, or to decontaminate or cause to be decontaminated 
any facility of which there is reasonable cause to be-
lieve that it may endanger public health.
To procure, by condemnation or otherwise, construct, 
lease, transport, store, maintain, renovate, or distribute 
materials and facilities as may be reasonable and nec-
essary for emergency response, with the right to take 
immediate possession thereof.
To control ingress and egress to and from any stricken 
or threatened public area, the movement of persons 
within the area, and the occupancy of premises therein, 
if such action is reasonable and necessary for emer-
gency response.
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